It is questionable as to why a country, with such nautical and economic dominance, failed to intervene earlier and suppress evidently hostile actors in the international community. It is widely documented that his personality lacked the great courage and vision intrinsically required of a man in his immense position [6]. These characteristics translated into ambiguous British policy, with a half-hearted attachment to its allies and a prolonged, irrational stance towards its adversaries, when an extended arm to the Central Powers would have done much to reduce the rigidity of matters.
Earlier agreements, such as the Entente with France in , can be viewed as a measure to protect colonial interests and consequently obscured the contentious issues of the day. The remaining days before war broke out go further to condemn Grey and thus Britain, in their role and subsequent responsibility.
It is worth noting fairly bluntly at this point, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated just under a month before. By this point, Serbia had already ordered the mobilisation of its troops and Russia had arranged for its troops to be stationed on the Russo-Austrian frontier [14] and can therefore be seen as typically ignorant of a man who lacked the foresight and ingenuity to keep pace with events that would transpire.
Its political agenda was blighted by domestic troubles, specifically in Ulster, where a sectarian battle was beginning to emerge over whether it would be governed by Dublin [16] , or Britain. The Parliament Act of certainly portrays how the Commons was preoccupied with overruling the vote of the Lords.
Diplomatic and strategic commitment, with a practical and political non-commitment [18] , whilst certainly not ideal to quelling the disorder that existed, has to be comparatively viewed as peaceful, particularly when studying the actions of Germany and Austria Hungary.
German imperialism, under the banner of Weltmachtpolitik, provided the framework for the basic tensions in the entire pre war period. Promoted by the pan-Germanist elites, it primarily emerged through the Triple Alliance, which, through providing access to new trade routes and a platform for colonial expansion, can be legitimately viewed as a clear basis for ambitions to become a fledgling world power [21]. Finally, it transpired as a physical threat to the international community in the port of Agadir in , but also in a passive aggressive manner, through the infamous blank cheque given to Austria Hungary.
This had the purpose of removing Serbian demands for autonomy, whom Austria had assumed played a collaborative role in the assassination, based on a supposed association with Gavrilo Principe, the assassin. Furthermore, Weltpolitik can be seen as the origin of widespread anti-German sentiment amongst public opinion of the other great powers.
Such a war-hungry mentality emerged extremely belatedly in Britain. WW1 did not break out by accident or because diplomacy failed. It broke out as the result of a conspiracy between the governments of imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary to bring about war, albeit in the hope that Britain would stay out.
After 25 years of domination by Kaiser Wilhelm II with his angry, autocratic and militaristic personality, his belief in the clairvoyance of all crowned heads, his disdain for diplomats and his conviction that his Germanic God had predestined him to lead his country to greatness, the 20 or so men he had appointed to decide the policy of the Reich opted for war in in what they deemed to be favourable circumstances. Germany's military and naval leaders, the predominant influence at court, shared a devil-may-care militarism that held war to be inevitable, time to be running out, and - like their Austrian counterparts - believed it would be better to go down fighting than to go on tolerating what they regarded as the humiliating status quo.
In the spring of , this small group of men in Berlin decided to make "the leap into the dark" which they knew their support for an Austrian attack on Serbia would almost certainly entail. The fine-tuning of the crisis was left to the civilian chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, whose primary aim was to subvert diplomatic intervention in order to begin the war under the most favourable conditions possible.
In particular, he wanted to convince his own people that Germany was under attack and to keep Britain out of the conflict. Long before the outbreak of hostilities Prussian-German conservative elites were convinced that a European war would help to fulfil Germany's ambitions for colonies and for military as well as political prestige in the world. The actual decision to go to war over a relatively minor international crisis like the Sarajevo murder, however, resulted from a fatal mixture of political misjudgement, fear of loss of prestige and stubborn commitments on all sides of a very complicated system of military and political alliances of European states.
In contrast to the historian Fritz Fischer who saw German war aims - in particular the infamous September Programme of with its far-reaching economic and territorial demands - at the core of the German government's decision to go to war, most historians nowadays dismiss this interpretation as being far too narrow. They tend to place German war aims, or incidentally all other belligerent nations' war aims, in the context of military events and political developments during the war.
Whole libraries have been filled with the riddle of Was the war an accident or design, inevitable or planned, caused by sleepwalkers or arsonists? To my mind the war was no accident and it could have been avoided in July In Vienna the government and military leaders wanted a war against Serbia. The immediate reaction to the murder of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June was to seek redress from Serbia, which was thought to have been behind the assassination plot and which had been threatening Austria-Hungary's standing in the Balkans for some time.
Crucially, a diplomatic victory was considered worthless and "odious". At the beginning of July, Austria's decision-makers chose war. But in order to implement their war against Serbia they needed support from their main ally Germany.
Without Germany, their decision to fight against Serbia could not have been implemented. The Berlin government issued a "blank cheque" to its ally, promising unconditional support and putting pressure on Vienna to seize this golden opportunity. Both governments knew it was almost certain that Russia would come to Serbia's aid and this would turn a local war into a European one, but they were willing to take this risk. Germany's guarantee made it possible for Vienna to proceed with its plans - a "no" from Berlin would have stopped the crisis in its tracks.
With some delay Vienna presented an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July which was deliberately unacceptable. This was because Austria-Hungary was bent on a war and Germany encouraged it because the opportunity seemed perfect. Victory still seemed possible whereas in a few years' time Russia and France would have become invincible.
Out of a mixture of desperation and over-confidence the decision-makers of Austria-Hungary and Germany unleashed a war to preserve and expand their empires. The war that ensued would be their downfall. It is human nature to seek simple, satisfying answers, which is why the German war guilt thesis endures today. Without Berlin's encouragement of a strong Austro-Hungarian line against Serbia after Sarajevo - the "blank cheque" - WW1 would clearly not have broken out.
So Germany does bear responsibility. But it is equally true that absent a terrorist plot launched in Belgrade the Germans and Austrians would not have faced this terrible choice.
Civilian leaders in both Berlin and Vienna tried to "localise" conflict in the Balkans. There is the structuralists who believe it was a result of wartime problems, that it was a improvised response to the problems. However there is the intentionalists who believe Hitler planned the holocaust due to his pathological hatred of the Jews. Now in this essay I am going to present the evidence for both schools of thought. There is substantial. Germany is responsible for the outbreak of war or rather the responsibility of individual countries such as Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary and the Balkans collectively.
However, Germany should be blamed to the full extent of starting WW1 due to the reasons that Germany had unconditional support for Austria, Germany 's war plans were planned to cause more conflict and Germany 's mobilization schedule. German historian Fritz Fischer argues that Germany 's desire for world power was the reason. After the World Wars global power structures were changed completely; whether being by the actions Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, or Franklin Delano Roosevelt the way the country was previously run was no longer in continuation.
New policies and beliefs were now being enforced on the citizens of these countries. However despite some distaste for these laws the people wanted change and these three individuals came to power at the right time. An Inspector calls round to question the family on the death a girl called Eva Smith who committed suicide by drinking strong disinfectant because she was very depressed.
The author J. Priestly was educated at Cambridge University, and by the age of. Maori had non-violent ways of resolving disputes. These include tactics such as diplomacy, arranged marriages, gifts, asset stripping and escape to avoid war. Who caused the outbreak of World War One?
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